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Abstract
We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous 2nd price auctions (S2PA) under a
natural condition of no underbidding. No underbidding means that an agent’s bid on every item
is at least its marginal value given the outcome. In a 2nd price auction, underbidding on an
item is weakly dominated by bidding the item’s marginal value. Indeed, the no underbidding
assumption is justified both theoretically and empirically.
We establish bounds on the PoA of S2PA under no underbidding for different valuation
classes, in both full-information and incomplete information settings. To derive our results,
we introduce a new parameterized property of auctions, namely (γ, δ)-revenue guaranteed, and
show that every auction that is (γ, δ)-revenue guaranteed has PoA at least γ/(1+δ). An auction
that is both (λ, µ)-smooth and (γ, δ)-revenue guaranteed has PoA at least (γ + λ)/(1 + δ + µ).
Via extension theorems, these bounds extend to coarse correlated equilibria in full information
settings, and to Bayesian PoA (BPoA) in settings with incomplete information.
We show that S2PA with submodular valuations and no underbidding is (1, 1)-revenue guar-
anteed, implying that the PoA is at least 1
2
. Together with the known (1, 1)-smoothness (under
the standard no overbididng assumption), it gives PoA of 2/3 (which extends via the exten-
sion theorems), and this is tight (even with respect to unit-demand valuations). For valuations
beyond submodular valuations we employ a stronger condition of set no underbidding, which
extends the no underbidding condition to sets of items. We show that S2PA with set no un-
derbidding is (1, 1)-revenue guaranteed for arbitrary valuations, implying a PoA of at least
1/2. Together with no overbidding we get a lower bound of 2
3
on the Bayesian PoA for XOS
valuations, and on the PoA for subadditive valuations.
Our results also shed new light on the relative performance of S2PA and their S1PA coun-
terparts. Specifically, under the standard no overbidding assumption, S1PA has better BPoA
bounds than S2PA, but the situation flips when considering both no overbidding and no under-
bidding.
1 Introduction
Simple auctions are often preferred in practice over complex truthful auctions. There has been a
vast literature in the last decade studying the performance of simple auctions, using the price of
anarchy (PoA) measure. The PoA is the ratio between the worst performance of an auction in
equilibrium (for different equilibrium notions, see below) and the optimal outcome, with respect to
some objective function.
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Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement
No. 866132)
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Starting with the seminal paper of Christodoulou et al. [4, 5], a lot of effort has been given to
quantifying the performance of simultaneous item auctions, using the PoA measure with respect
to the social welfare objective. In a simultaneous item auctions, bidders submit bids on individual
items despite the fact that their valuation is non-linear and exhibit different levels of substitutes
and complements. Clearly, these auctions are non-truthful; bidders don’t even have the language
to express their true valuations. The main message from [4] and follow-up work [16; 1; 11; 17; 9;
19; 6; 18] is that the performance of simultaneous item auctions is nearly optimal as long as the
valuations are subadditive (also known as complement free).
The PoA of simple auctions has been studied with respect to different equilibrium notions
in both complete- and incomplete-information settings. The most natural equilibrium notion in
complete-information setting is pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), but PoA results have been extended
to mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE), correlated equilibrium (CE), coarse-correlated equilibrium
(CCE) and learning-based equilibrium notions [2; 16; 1; 17; 9; 19; 6; 18]. For precise definitions
of these equilibrium notions, see Section 2.1. In the incomplete-information setting, the profile of
bidder values is drawn from a known probability distribution. Every bidder knows her own value,
but only the probability distribution of others’ values. The Bayesian PoA (BPoA) measures the
performance of the worst Bayes Nash equilibrium, where every bidder maximizes her utility in
expectation over the other bidders’ values.
In simultaneous item auctions with n bidders and m items, every bidder i has a valuation
function vi : 2
[m] → R+, where vi(S) is the value bidder i assigns to set S ⊆ [m]. The valuation
function is assumed to be monotone and normalized. Despite the combinatorial structure of the
valuation, bidders submit bids on every item separately and simultaneously. Let bi = (bi1, . . . , bim)
be the bid vector of bidder i, where bij is the bid of bidder i for item j, and b = (b1, . . . ,bn) be
the bid profile of all bidders. Every item j is sold separately via an auction based on bids on item
j alone.
The two main auction formats studied in the literature are simultaneous first-price auctions
(S1PA) and simultaneous second-price auctions (S2PA). As their names suggest, in S1PA, every
item is sold in a 1st-price auction; i.e., highest bidder wins and pays her bid, whereas in S2PA every
item is sold in a 2nd-price auction; i.e., highest bidder wins and pays the 2nd highest bid.
The PoA and BPoA of simultaneous item auctions depend on the structure of the valuation
functions. A hierarchy of complement-free valuations is given in [13]. Four important classes of
valuations include unit-demand, submodular, xos, and subadditive valuations, with the following
strict containment relation:
unit− demand ⊂ submodular ⊂ xos ⊂ subadditive ⊂ monotone,
A unit-demand valuation v is one where there exist values v(1), . . . , v(m), and v(S) = maxj∈S v(j).
A subadditive valuation is one where v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ), also known as a complement-free
valuation, as the value of the union of any two sets never exceeds the sum of their values. The other
valuations are formally defined in Section 2.2. Clearly, the PoA can only degrade as one moves to
a larger valuation class.
PoA and BPoA of simultaneous 2nd price item auctions (S2PA): previous results.
There are some pathological examples showing that the PoA of S2PA can be arbitrarily bad, even
in the simplest scenario of single item auction [5]. A common approach toward overcoming such
pathological examples is the no overbidding (NOB) assumption, stating that the sum of player
bids on the a set of items she wins under bid profile b, Si(b), never exceeds its value vi(Si(b)).
Consequently, all PoA and BPoA results for S2PA are derived under the NOB assumption.
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The PoA of S2PA with NOB for subadditive valuations is 1/2 [1]. This is tight even with respect
to unit-demand valuations. The BPoA of S2PA for xos valuations is 1/2 [5]. For subadditive
valuations the BPoA is at least 1/4, and is strictly smaller than 1/2 [9]. Finally, going beyond
subadditive valuation is hopeless: there are instances where the PoA can be as bad as O(1/
√
m)
[11; 9]. The above results are summarized in Table 1.
UD / SM XOS SA MON
iNUB PoA,BPoA 12* Θ
(
1
m
)
* arbitrarily bad*
sNUB PoA,BPoA 12 ← 12 ← 12 ← 12*
PoA 12 ← 12 [5] 12 [1] O
(
1√
m
)
∼ [11; 9]
NOB iBPoA 12 ← 12 [5] 14
∼
[9] O
(
1√
m
)
∼ [11; 9]
BPoA O
(
1
n1/4
)
∼ [1] O
(
1
n1/4
)
∼ [1] O
(
1
n1/4
)
∼ [1] O
(
1
n1/4
)
∼ [1]
sNUB+ PoA 23 ← 23* 23* 12*
NOB iBPoA 23 ← 23* 12 ← 12*
BPoA 12 ← 12 ← 12 ← 12*
Table 1: Price of anarchy lower bounds for simultaneous second price auctions. PoA is the price
of anarchy under full information, iBPoA is the Bayesian PoA under independent valuation distri-
butions, and BPoA is the Bayesian PoA under correlated valuation distributions. All results are
tight, except those marked with ∼. Results derived from the current paper are marked with *.
Results derived as a special case of a more general result (to their right) are marked with ←.
No Underbidding (NUB) Consider the following example (taken from [5]), showing that the
PoA for unit-demand valuations is 1/2.
Example 1.1. 2 bidders, and 2 items: x, y. Bidder 1 is unit-demand with values v1(x) = 2, v1(y) =
1. Bidder 2 is unit-demand with values v2(x) = 1, v2(y) = 2. Consider the following bid profile
(which is a PNE that adheres to NOB): b1x = b2y = 0, and b1y = b2x = 1. Under this bid profile,
bidders 1 and 2 receive items y and x, respectively, for a social welfare of 2. The optimal welfare
is 4.
In this equilibrium, bidder 1 prefers item x, yet bids 0 on item x, and gets item y instead. The
same goes for bidder 2 with respect to item y. In what sense is this an equilibrium? To answer this
question, we should revisit the foundation of the notion of an equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is
a descriptive, static notion, where no player can make a profitable deviation given the strategies of
others. While a NE is a static notion, it is based on the underlying assumption that players engage
in some dynamics, where they keep best responding to the current situation until a stable outcome
is reached.
Let us revisit the PNE bid profile in Example 1.1 in light of this interpretation. For two sets
S, T , the marginal value of T given S is defined as v(T | S) = v(S ∪T )− v(S). Bidder 1’s marginal
value for item x, given her current allocation (item y) is 1. For bidder 1, bidding 0 on item x
is weakly dominated by bidding the marginal value of item x given the current outcome, which is
v1(x | y) = v1(xy)− v1(y) = 1. Indeed, if bidder 1 gets item x, her marginal value is 1 and she pays
at most 1, so why not?
If a bidder bids on an item less than the item’s marginal value, we say that she underbids.
Formally, a bidder i is said to underbid on item j in a bid profile b if bij < vi(j | Si(b)), where
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Si(b) is the set of items i wins under b. For example, in Example 1.1, bidder 1 underbids on item
a (and similarly, bidder 2 underbids on item b). In Section 4 we show that underbidding in a 2nd
price auction is weakly dominated in some precise sense.
No-underbidding is not only a mere theoretical exercise. In second price auctions a lot of
empirical evidence suggest that bidders tend to overbid, but not underbid (e.g., Kagel and Levin
[12], Harstad [10], Cooper and Fang [7] and Roider and Schmitz [15]). It seems that ”laboratory
second-price auctions exhibit substantial and persistent overbidding, even with prior experience”
[10]. The no-underbidding assumption is also consistent with the assumption made by Nisan et al.
[14] that bidders break tie in favor of the highest bid that does not exceed their value. We therefore
believe that to get a more accurate measure of the performance of simultaneous 2nd price auctions,
we should impose a no underbidding assumption. This begs the following natural question:
Main Question. What is the performance (measured by PoA/BPoA) of simultaneous 2nd price
item auctions under a no underbidding assumption?
1.1 Our Contribution
We first introduce the notion of item no underbidding (iNUB), where no agent underbids on any
item. One might think that by imposing both NOB and iNUB, the optimal welfare will be achieved.
This is indeed the case for a single item auction (where the optimal welfare is achieved by imposing
any one of these assumptions alone). However, even a simple scenario with 2 items and 2 unit-
demand bidders can have a PNE with sub-optimal welfare. This is demonstrated in the following
example.
Example 1.2. 2 bidders, and 2 items: x, y. Bidder 1 is unit-demand with values v1(x) = 3, v1(y) =
2. Bidder 2 is unit-demand with values v2(x) = 2, v2(y) = 3. Consider the following PNE bid profile,
which adheres to both NOB and iNUB: b1x = b2y = 1, b1y = b2x = 2. Under this bid profile, bidders
1 and 2 receive items y and x, respectively, for a social welfare of 4. The optimal welfare is 6. Thus,
the PoA is 2/3.
Our first result states that 2/3 is the worst possible ratio for bid profiles satisfying both NOB
and iNUB, even for submodular valuations and even in settings with incomplete information (with
a product distribution over valuations). In fact, a weaker condition than iNUB suffices for this
result, requiring no underbidding only on items j ∈ S∗i (v)\Si(b), where S∗i (v) is the set of items
that bidder i receives in an optimal allocation under valuation profile v, and Si(b) is the set of
items she wins under bid profile b.
Theorem [submodular valuations, NOB and iNUB]: For every market with submodular
valuations,
• The PoA with respect to CCE and the BPoA (for product or correlated distribution) of S2PA
under iNUB are both at least 12 (see Corollary 5.2, which is derived from Theorems 3.5 and
5.1).
• The PoA with respect to CCE, and the BPoA (for product distribution) of S2PA under NOB
and iNUB are both at least 23 (see Corollary 5.7, which is derived from Theorems 5.1, 2.16,
and 3.6).
The above results are tight, even with respect to PNE and even for unit-demand valuations.
Moreover, the last theorem extends to α-submodular valuations, defined as v(j | S) ≥ α·v(j | T )
for every S ⊆ T . We show that the (B)PoA degrades gracefully with the parameter α; namely the
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PoA with respect to CCE and the BPoA are at least α1+α under iNUB and at least
2α
2+α under NOB
and iNUB.
Beyond (α-)submodular valuations, however, these bounds break. In particular, in Example 6.1
we present an instance with 2 xos bidders and m items, where the PoA with iNUB is 2
m
. We also
prove that this is the worst possible PoA, showing that the (B)PoA with xos bidders and m items
is always at least 1
m+1 (see Appendix E). Moreover, in Example E.3 we show an instance with 4
items and 2 xos bidders, where the PoA with NOB and iNUB is 1/2, which is no better than the
guarantee obtained with NOB alone.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first PoA separation between submodular and xos
valuations in simultaneous item auctions. In fact, the PoA of simultaneous item auctions is often
the same for the entire range between unit-demand and xos.
A few remarks are in order. First, the above separation suggests that xos is “far” from sub-
modular. Indeed, in Appendix A we show that xos is not α-submodular for any fixed 0 < α ≤ 1,
even in settings with identical items. Second, under iNUB alone (without NOB), the BPoA of α-
submodular valuations is at least α1+α (1/2 for submodular valuations). For xos valuations, however,
iNUB alone is not helpful; the PoA may be O(1/m) (see Appendix E).
To deal with valuations beyond submodular, we consider a different no underbidding assump-
tion, which applies to sets of items. A bidder is said to not underbid on a set of items S if∑
j∈S bij ≥ vi(S | Si(b)). The new condition, set no underbidding (sNUB), imposes the set no
underbidding condition on every bidder i with respect to the set S = S∗i (v)\Si(b).
With the sNUB definition, the 2/3 PoA extends to subadditive valuations in full information
settings, and to xos valuations even in incomplete information settings (with product distributions).
Theorem [subadditive and xos valuations, NOB and sNUB]: For every market with sub-
additive valuations, the PoA with respect to CCE of S2PA under NOB and sNUB is at least 2/3
(see Theorem 7.2). For every market with xos valuations, the BPoA (under product distribution)
of S2PA under NOB and sNUB is at least 2/3 (see Corollary 6.2, which is derived from Theorems
2.15, 4.6 and 3.6). Both results are tight.
For incomplete information we show that the BPoA of subadditive valuations is at least 1/2 of
the optimal social welfare and it can be obtained in a much stronger sense, namely for every bid
profile with non-negative sum of utilities (even a non-equilibrium profile) satisfying sNUB. This
also holds for markets with arbitrary monotone valuations.
Theorem [Arbitrary valuations, sNUB]: For every market (arbitrary monotone valuations),
the PoA with respect to CCE and the BPoA (for any joint distribution) of S2PA under sNUB is
at least 1/2 (see Corollary 4.7).
Equilibrium existence PoA results make sense only when the corresponding equilibrium exists.
We show that every market with XOS valuations admits a PNE satisfying sNUB and NOB. For
subadditive valuations, a PNE might not exist (even without any NOB or NUB conditions). How-
ever, under a finite discretized version of the auction, a mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist, and we show that there is at least one bid profile that admits both sNUB and NOB with
arbitrary monotone valuation functions.
Interestingly, our results shed new light on the comparison between simultaneous 1st and 2nd
price auctions.
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S1PA vs. S2PA Table 2 specifies BPoA lower bounds for S1PA and S2PA under NOB, assuming
independent valuation distributions. According to these results, one may conclude that S1PA
perform better than their S2PA counterparts. Indeed, for S2PA, the PoA is 1/2 even for unit-
demand bidders and even with respect to PNE [5], whereas the BPoA of S1PA is at least 1− 1/e,
even for the much more general class of xos valuations and with respect to the much more general
class of Bayesian NE [19]. Similarly, the BPoA of S2PA may be smaller than 1/2 for subadditive
valuations [9], whereas it is always at least 1/2 for S1PA[9].
Our new results shed more light on the relative performance of S2PA and S1PA. When consid-
ering both no overbidding and no underbidding, the situation flips, and S2PA are superior to S1PA.
For xos valuations, the 1 − 1/e bound for S1PA persists, but for S2PA the bound improves from
1/2 < 1−1/e to 2/3 > 1−1/e. For subadditive valuations and independent valuation distributions,
S2PA under sNUB performs as well as S1PA (achieving BPoA of 1/2), however in S2PA the 1/2
bound holds also for correlated valuation distributions. For valuations beyond subadditive, S2PA
performs better (1/2 for S2PA and less than 1/2 for S1PA). Note that no underbidding is not a rea-
sonable assumption in first price auctions, where bidders pay their bids, therefore no underbidding
is only relevant in S2PA.
UD / SM XOS SA MON
S2PA NOB 12 ← 12 [5] 14 [9] O
(
1√
m
)
[11; 9]
S1PA 1− 1
e
← 1− 1
e
[19; 6] 12 [9; 6]
1
m
[11]
S2PA sNUB+NOB 23 ← 23
∗ 1
2 (corr) ← 12
∗
(corr)
Table 2: Bayesian price of anarchy results for simultaneous first price and second price auctions.
In cells that say ”corr”, the bound holds also for correlated distributions. Results derived from the
current paper are marked with *. Results derived as a special case of a more general result (to
their right) are marked with ←.
1.2 Our Techniques
The standard technique for establishing performance guarantees for equilibria of simple auctions
(i.e., PoA results) is the smoothness framework (see the survey in [18]). Smoothness is a parameter-
ized notion; an auction is said to be (λ, µ)-smooth if for any valuation profile v and any bid profile
b there exists a bid b∗i (v) for each player i, s.t.
∑
i∈[n] ui(b
∗
i (v),b−i, vi) ≥ λOPT (v)− µSW (b,v).
It is quite straightforward to show that if an auction is (λ, µ)-smooth, then its PoA with respect to
PNE is at least λ1+µ .
The power of the smoothness framework is in its extendability. While a lower bound on the
PoA with respect to PNE follows easily from the smoothness property, this lower bound extends
beyond this equilibrium notion [16; 17; 18; 19]. The first extension theorem shows that smoothness
leads to the same PoA bound even with respect to CCE (in full information settings). The second
extension theorem shows that smoothness also leads to the same lower bound on the Bayesian PoA
in games with incomplete information.
We introduce a new parameterized notion called revenue guaranteed. An auction is said to be
(γ, δ)-revenue guaranteed if for every valuation profile v and bid profile b the revenue of the auction
is bounded below by γOPT (v) − δSW(b,v).
We show that in every (γ, δ)-revenue guaranteed auction, the social welfare in every bid profile
with non-negative sum of utilities is at least a fraction γ1+δ of the optimal welfare. Similarly to
the smoothness framework, we augment our results with two extension theorems, one for PoA with
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respect to CCE, and one for BPoA in settings with incomplete information. Moreover, this result
holds also in cases where the joint distribution of bidder valuations is correlated (whereas previous
BPoA results hold only under a product distribution over valuations).
Combining the two tools of smoothness and revenue guaranteed, we get an improved bound. In
particular, we show that in every auction that is both (λ, µ)-smooth and (γ, δ)-revenue guaranteed,
the PoA with respect to CCE is at least λ+γ1+µ+δ . The same holds for the BPoA under product
valuation distributions.
With this tool in hand, we analyze simultaneous 2nd price auctions with different valua-
tions functions and different no underbidding conditions, where the goal is to establish revenue-
guaranteed parameters that would imply PoA and BPoA bounds.
We first consider submodular and α-submodular valuations. We show that every S2PA with
α-submodular valuations satisfying iNUB is (α,α)-revenue guaranteed. This directly gives a lower
bound of α1+α on the BPoA of α-submodular valuations (and 1/2 for submodular valuations). We
also show that S2PA with α-submodular valuations satisfying NOB are (α, 1)-smooth. Combining
(α,α)-revenue guaranteed with (α, 1)-smoothness gives a bound of 2α2+α on the BPoA for every
S2PA with α-submodular valuations with NOB and iNUB. For submodular valuations this gives
the tight 2/3 bound.
For valuations beyond α-submodular valuations, the iNUB condition is not helpful, so we turn
to the stronger sNUB condition. We show that every S2PA with arbitrary monotone valuations
satisfying sNUB is (1, 1)-revenue guaranteed for bid profiles with non-negative sum of utilities.
This recovers the 1/2 bound on PoA with respect to CCE and BPoA with correlated distributions
for S2PA satisfying sNUB. For XOS valuations, we combine the last result with the known (1, 1)-
smoothness to get the 2/3 bound for S2PA satisfying NOB and sNUB (for PoA with respect to
CCE and for BPoA with product distributions). For subadditive valuations, we apply the technique
from [1] to yield a tight bound of 2/3 on the PoA with respect to CCE.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Auctions
Combinatorial auctions In a combinatorial auction a set of m non-identical items are sold to a
group of n players. Let Si be the set of possible allocations to player i, Vi the set of possible
valuations of player i, and Bi the set of actions available to player i. Similarly, we let S ⊆
S1 × . . . × Sn be the allocation space of all players, V = V1 × . . . × Vn be the valuation space,
and B = B1 × . . . × Bn be the action space. An allocation function maps an action profile to an
allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ S, where Si is the set of items allocated to player i. A payment
function maps an action profile to a non negative payment P = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ R+, where Pi is
the payment of player i. We assume that the valuation function vi : Si → R+ of a player i, where
vi ∈ Vi, is monotone and normalized, i.e., ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [m], vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) and also vi(∅) = 0. We
let v = (v1, . . . , vn) be the valuation profile. An outcome is a pair of allocation S and payment P
and the revenue is the sum of all payments, i.e. R(b) = ∑i∈[n] Pi(b). We assume a quasi-linear
utility function, i.e. ui(Si, Pi, vi) = vi(Si) − Pi. We are interested in measuring the social welfare,
which is the sum of bidder valuations, i.e., SW (S,v) =
∑
i∈[n] vi(Si). Given a valuation profile
v, an optimal allocation is an allocation that maximizes the SW over all possible allocations. We
denote by OPT (v) the social welfare value of an optimal allocation.
Simultaneous item bidding auction In a simultaneous item bidding auction (simultaneous
item auction, in short) each item j ∈ [m] is simultaneously sold in a separate auction. An action
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profile is a bid profile b = (b1, . . . ,bn), where bi = (bi1, . . . , bim) is an m-vector s.t. bij is the bid
of player i to item j. The allocation of each item j is determined by the bids (b1j , . . . , bnj). We
use Si(b) to denote the items won by player i and pj(b) to denote the price paid by the winner of
item j. As allocation and payment are uniquely defined by the bid profile, we overload notation
and write ui(b, vi) and SW (b,v).
In a simultaneous second price auction (S2PA), each item j is allocated to the highest bidder,
who pays the second highest bid, i.e., Pi =
∑
j∈Si(b)maxk 6=i bkj.
In a simultaneous first price auction (S1PA), each item j is allocated to the highest bidder, who
pays her bid for that item, i.e., Pi =
∑
j∈Si(b) bij.
Full information setting: solution concepts and PoA In the full information setting, the
valuation profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) is known to all players. The standard equilibrium concepts in
this setting are pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE), correlated Nash
equilibrium (CE) and coarse correlated Nash equilibrium (CCE), where PNE ⊂ MNE ⊂ CE ⊂
CCE. Following are the definitions of the equilibrium concepts. As standard, for a vector y, we
denote by y−i the vector y with the ith component removed. Also, we denote with ∆(Ω) the space
of probability distributions over a finite set Ω.
Definition 2.1 (Pure Nash Equilibriun (PNE)). A bid profile b ∈ B1 × . . .× Bn is a PNE if
for any i ∈ [n] and for any b′i ∈ Bi, ui(b, vi) ≥ ui(b
′
i,b−i, vi).
Definition 2.2 (Mixed Nash Equilibriun (MNE)). A bid profile of randomized bids b ∈
∆(B1)×. . .×∆(Bn) is a MNE if for any i ∈ [n] and for any b′i ∈ Bi, Eb [ui(b, vi)] ≥ Eb−i
[
ui(b
′
i,b−i, vi)
]
.
Definition 2.3 (Correlated Nash Equilibriun (CE)). A bid profile of randomized bids b ∈
∆(B1 × . . . × Bn) is a CE if for any i ∈ [n] and for any mapping b′i(bi), Eb [ui(b, vi) | bi] ≥
Eb
[
ui(b
′
i,b−i, vi) | bi
]
.
Definition 2.4 (Coarse Correlated Nash Equilibriun (CCE)). A bid profile of randomized
bids b ∈ ∆(B1 × . . . × Bn) is a CCE if for any i ∈ [n] and for any b′i ∈ Bi, Eb [ui(b, vi)] ≥
Eb
[
ui(b
′
i,b−i, vi)
]
.
For a given instance of valuations v, the price of anarchy (PoA) with respect to an equilibrium
notion E is defined as: PoA(v) = infb∈E
Eb[SW (b,v)]
OPT (v) . For example, the PoA with respect to PNE
is PoA(v) = infb∈PNE
SW (b,v)
OPT (v) . The PoA for the other equilibrium types are defined in a similar
manner. For a family of valuations V, PoA(V) = minv∈V PoA(v).
The following lemma will be useful in subsequent sections of this paper.
Lemma 2.5. Consider an S2PA and a valuation v. Let S∗(v) = (S∗1(v), . . . , S
∗
n(v)) be a welfare-
maximizing allocation. Then, for every bid profile b the following holds:
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij
Proof. Let S∗−i(v) = S
∗(v)\S∗i (v). Since payments are non-negative, Si(b) ∩ S∗−i(v) ⊆ Si(b), and
each item is sold in a separate second price auction, we get:
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n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)∩S∗−i(v)
pj(b) =
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)∩S∗−i(v)
maxk 6=i bkj
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
l=1,l 6=i
∑
j∈Si(b)∩S∗l (v)
maxk 6=i bkj ≥
n∑
i=1
n∑
l=1,l 6=i
∑
j∈Si(b)∩S∗l (v)
blj (1)
=
n∑
l=1
∑
j∈S∗l (v)\Sl(b)
blj
Inequality (1) holds since blj is at most the second highest bid on item j ∈ Si(b). Notice that
the term in (1) considers for each player i all the items she wins in bid profile b, which are allocated
to some other player l 6= i in the optimal allocation. Instead, we can change the order of summation
and consider for each player l all the items which are allocated to her in the optimal allocation,
but not in bid profile b. This accounts for the last equality.
Incomplete information setting: solution concepts and Bayesian PoA In an incomplete
information setting, player valuations are drawn from a commonly known, possibly correlated, joint
distribution F ∈ ∆(V1× . . .×Vn), and the valuation vi of each player is a private information which
is known only to player i. The strategy of player i is a function σi : Vi → Bi. Let Σi denote the
strategy space of player i and Σ = Σ1 × . . . × Σn the strategy space of all players. We denote by
σ(v) = (σ1(v1), . . . , (σn(vn)) the bid vector given a valuation profile v.
In some cases, we assume that the joint distribution of the valuations is a product distribution,
i.e., F = F1 × . . . × Fn ∈ ∆(V1) × . . . ×∆(Vn). In these cases, each valuation vi is independently
drawn from the commonly known distribution Fi ∈ ∆(Vi).
The standard equilibrium concepts in the incomplete information setting are the Bayes Nash
equilibrium (BNE) and the mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium (MBNE):
Definition 2.6 (Bayes Nash Equilibriun (BNE)). A strategy profile σ is a BNE if for any
i ∈ [n], any vi ∈ Vi and any b′i ∈ Bi,
Ev−i|vi [ui(σi(vi), σ−i(v−i), vi)] ≥ Ev−i|vi
[
ui(b
′
i, σ−i(v−i), vi)
]
(2)
Definition 2.7 (Mixed Bayes Nash Equilibriun (MBNE)). A randomized strategy profile σ
is a MBNE if for any i ∈ [n], any vi ∈ Vi and any b′i ∈ Bi,
Ev−i|viEσ [ui(σi(vi), σ−i(v−i), vi)] ≥ Ev−i|viEσ−i
[
ui(b
′
i, σ−i(v−i), vi)
]
Note that if player valuations are independent, we can omit the conditioning on vi in Definitions
2.6 and 2.7.
The Bayes Nash price of anarchy is:
BPoA = inf
F , σ∈BNE
Ev [SW (σ(v),v)]
Ev [OPT (v)]
The mixed Bayes Nash price of anarchy is defined similarly w.r.t. MBNE.
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2.2 Valuation Classes
In what follows we present the valuation functions considered in this paper. As standard, for a
valuation v, item j and set S, we denote the marginal value of item j, given set S, as v(j | S); i.e.,
v(j | S) = v(S ∪ {j})− v(S). In a similar manner, the marginal value of a set S′ , given a set S, is
v(S
′ | S) = v(S ∪ S′)− v(S). Following are the valuation classes we consider:
unit-demand (UD): A valuation function v is UD if there exist values v1, . . . , vm such that for
every set S ⊆ [m], v(S) = maxj∈Svj.
submodular (SM): A valuation function v is SM if for every two sets S ⊆ T ⊆ [m] and element
j /∈ T , v(j | S) ≥ v(j | T ).
xos (also known as fractionally subadditive): A valuation function v is XOS if there exists a
set L of additive valuations {aℓ(·)}ℓ∈L, such that for every set S ⊆ [m], v(S) = maxℓ∈Laℓ(S).
subadditive (SA): A valuation function v is SA if for any subsets S, T ⊆ [m], v(S) + v(T ) ≥
v(S ∪ T ).
monotone (MON): A valuation function v is MON if ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ [m], vi(S) ≤ vi(T ).
A strict containment hierarchy of the above valuation classes is known: UD ⊂ SM ⊂ XOS ⊂
SA ⊂ MON . We now introduce a new class of valuation functions, parameterized by ‘how far’
they are from submodular valuations:
Definition 2.8 (α−submodular (α−SM)). A valuation function v is α−SM, for 0 < α ≤ 1, if
for every two sets S ⊆ T ⊆ [m] and element j /∈ T , v(j | S) ≥ α · v(j | T ).
Lemma 2.9. For any α−SM function v and any sets S, S′ : ∑j∈S′ v(j | S) ≥ α · v(S′ | S)
Proof. Let S
′
=
{
j1, j2, . . . , j|S′ |
}
. As v is α−SM, we have v(ji | S) ≥ α v(ji | S ∪ {j1, . . . , ji−1})
for every i = 1, . . . , |S′ |. Therefore, ∑j∈S′ v(j | S) = ∑|S′ |i=1 v(ji | S) ≥ α∑|S′ |i=1 v(ji | S ∪
{j1, . . . , ji−1}) = α · v(S′ | S). The inequality follows from α−submodularity, and the last equality
is due to telescoping sum.
Lemma 2.10. If a valuation function, v, is α−SM, then there exists a set L of additive valuations
{aℓ(·)}ℓ∈L, such that for every set S ⊆ [m], v(S) ≥ α ·maxℓ∈L
[
aℓ(S)
]
and there exists at least one
ℓ such that v(S) = aℓ(S).
Proof. The proof is an extension of the proof in Lehmann et al. [13] that any submodular function
is XOS. Define m! additive valuations aℓ, one for each permutation of the items in [m]. Let
aℓj = v(j | Sℓj), where Sℓj is the set of items in permutation ℓ preceding item j. For any permutation
ℓ and set S = {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊆ [m] with item j denoting the the jth item of S in the permutation ℓ,
aℓ(S) =
∑
j∈S
aℓj =
∑
j∈S
v(j | Sℓj)
≤
∑
j∈S
1
α
[v({1, 2, . . . , j})− v({1, 2, . . . , j − 1})] = 1
α
v(S),
where the inequality follows from the definition of α−SM. For any permutation ℓ in which the items
of S are placed first, we have v(S) = aℓ(S).
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By definition, any SM valuation is 1−SM. On the other hand, there is no α > 0, such that XOS
is α−SM. In Appendix A we give an example of identical items, XOS function, sets S ⊂ T and
j /∈ T such that v(j | S) < α · v(j | T ) for every α > 0.
2.3 Smooth Auctions
We use a smoothness definition based on Roughgarden [16] and Roughgarden et al. [18]:
Definition 2.11 (Smooth auction (based on [16], [18])). An auction is (λ, µ)−smooth for
parameters λ, µ ≥ 0 with respect to a bid space B′ ⊆ B1 × . . . × Bn, if for any valuation profile
v ∈ V1 × . . .× Vn and any bid profile b ∈ B′ there exists a bid b∗i (v) ∈ Bi for each player i, s.t.:∑
i∈[n]
ui(b
∗
i (v),b−i, vi) ≥ λ ·OPT (v)− µ · SW (b,v) (3)
It is shown in [16; 18] that for every (λ, µ)−smooth auction, the social welfare of any pure NE
is at least λ1+µ . Via extension theorems, this bound extends to CCE in full-information settings
and to Bayes NE in settings with incomplete information. These theorems are stated below, and
their proofs appear in Appendix B for completeness.
Theorem 2.12. (based on [16], [18]) If an auction is (λ, µ)−smooth with respect to a bid space
B′ ⊆ B1× . . .×Bn, then the expected social welfare of any coarse correlated equilibrium, b ∈ ∆(B′),
of the auction is at least λ1+µ of the optimal social welfare.
Theorem 2.13. (based on [17], [19]) If an auction is (λ, µ)−smooth with respect to a bid space
B′ ⊆ B1 × . . . × Bn, then for every product distribution F , every mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium,
σ : V1 × . . . × Vn → ∆(B′) has expected social welfare at least λ1+µ of the expected optimal social
welfare.
A standard assumption in essentially all previous work on the PoA of simultaneous second price
item auction (e.g., [5], [9], [17], [16], [1]) is no overbidding, meaning that players do not overbid on
items they win. Formally,
Definition 2.14 (No overbidding (NOB)). Given a valuation profile v ∈ V1 × . . . × Vn, a bid
profile b ∈ B is said to satisfy NOB if for every player i the following holds,∑
j∈Si(b)
bij ≤ vi(Si(b))
Theorem 2.15. (based on [5] and [16]): S2PA with XOS valuations is (1, 1)−smooth, with
respect to bid profiles satisfying NOB.
Proof. Christodoulou et al. [5] show that for S2PA with XOS player valuations there exists a bid
b∗i (v) for each player i, s.t. Inequality (3) with λ = µ = 1 holds for any bid profile that satisfies
NOB.
Theorem 2.15 implies a lower bound of 12 on the Bayesian PoA of S2PA with XOS valuations.
This result is tight, even with respect to unit-demand valuations in full information settings [5].
We now extend the last result to α-SM valuations.
Theorem 2.16. S2PA with α−SM valuations is (α, 1)−smooth, with respect to bid profiles satis-
fying NOB.
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Proof. Let v ∈ V1 × . . . × Vn be an α−SM valuation profile and let b be a PNE satisfying NOB.
From Lemma 2.10, for every valuation vi there exists a set {aℓi(·)}, such that for every set S ⊆ [m],
vi(S) ≥ α ·maxℓ
[
aℓi(S)
]
and there exists ℓ such that vi(S) = a
ℓ
i(S). Let S
∗(v) = (S∗1(v), . . . , S
∗
n(v))
be a welfare maximizing allocation, and let a∗i be an additive valuation such that vi(S
∗
i (v)) =
a∗i (S
∗
i (v)). Consider the following hypothetical deviation for player i: b
∗
ij = a
∗
ij if j ∈ S∗i (v), and
b∗ij = 0 otherwise.
Now let us consider the utility of player i when deviating. As b∗ij = 0 for every item j /∈ S∗i (v),
each such item contributes non-negative utility to i and we can ignore this contribution while
lower bounding i’s utility under b∗i . Consider item j ∈ S∗i (v). If a∗ij ≥ maxk 6=i bkj, player i wins
item j. Otherwise, i does not win item j, and the term a∗ij − maxk 6=i bkj is non-positive. Since
vi(S) ≥ α · a∗i (S) for every set S, and since α ≤ 1, we get:
∑
i∈[n]
ui(b
∗
i (v),b−i, vi) ≥
∑
i∈[n]

 ∑
j∈S∗i (v)∩Si(b)
(
α · a∗ij −max
k 6=i
bkj
)
+
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
(
a∗ij −max
k 6=i
bkj
)
≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
(
α · a∗ij −max
k 6=i
bkj
)
≥ α
∑
i∈[n]
vi(S
∗
i (v)) −
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
max
k
bkj
≥ α · OPT (v)−
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Si(b)
max
k
bkj
= α · OPT (v)−
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Si(b)
bkj
≥ α · OPT (v)−
∑
i∈[n]
vi(Si(b))
= α · OPT (v)− SW (b,v).
The third inequality follows from the choice of a∗i and by the payment structure of 2nd price.
The forth inequality follows by the fact that all items are allocated in equilibrium. Finally, the last
inequality follows from NOB.
3 Revenue Guaranteed Auctions
Following is the definition of revenue guaranteed auctions. We then discuss the implications of this
property in both full information and incomplete information settings.
Definition 3.1 (Revenue guaranteed auction). An auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed for
some 0 ≤ γ ≤ δ ≤ 1 with respect to a bid space B′ ⊆ B1 × . . . × Bn, if for any valuation profile
v ∈ V1× . . .×Vn and for any bid profile b ∈ B′ the revenue of the auction is at least γ ·OPT (v)−
δ · SW (b,v).
3.1 Full Information: Revenue Guaranteed Auctions
The following theorem establishes welfare guarantees on every pure bid profile of a (γ, δ)−revenue
guaranteed auction in which the sum of player utilities is non-negative.
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Theorem 3.2. If an auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed with respect to a bid space B′ ⊆ B1 ×
· · · × Bn, then for any pure bid profile b ∈ B′, in which the sum of player utilities is non-negative,
the social welfare is at least γ1+δ of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Using quasi-linear utilities and non-negative sum of player utilities, we get:
0 ≤
∑
i∈[n]
ui(b, vi) =
∑
i∈[n]
vi(Si(b))−
∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b) = SW (b,v)−
∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b)
By the (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed property,∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b) ≥ γOPT (v)− δSW (b,v).
Punting it all together, we get
0 ≤ SW (b,v)−
∑
i∈[n]
Pi(b) ≤ (1 + δ)SW (b,v) − γOPT (v) (4)
Rearranging, we get: SW (b,v) ≥ γ1+δOPT (v), as required.
Definition 3.1 considers pure bid profiles, but Theorem 3.2 applies to the more general setting
of randomized bid profiles, possibly correlated, as cast in the following extension theorem.
Theorem 3.3. If an auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed with respect to a bid space B′ ⊆ B1 ×
. . .×Bn, then for any bid profile b ∈ ∆(B′), in which the sum of the expected utilities of the players
is non-negative, the expected social welfare is at least γ1+δ of the optimal social welfare.
The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.2, except adding expectation over b to every
term, using the fact the the auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed for every b in the support of b,
and using linearity of expectation.
Clearly, in every equilibrium (including CCE) the expected utility of every player is non-
negative. It therefore follows that the expected welfare in any CCE is at least γ1+δ of the optimal
social welfare.
For an auction that is both smooth and revenue guaranteed, we give a better bound on the
price of anarchy:
Theorem 3.4. If an auction is (λ, µ)−smooth with respect to a bid space B′ and (γ, δ)−revenue
guaranteed with respect to a bid space B”, then the expected social welfare at any CCE ∈ ∆(B′∩B”)
of the auction is at least λ+γ1+µ+δ of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. The proof follows by the proofs of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 3.3. Let b ∈ ∆(B′ ∩ B”) be
a CCE of the auction. The proof of Theorem 2.12 shows that:∑
i∈[n]
Eb [ui(b, vi)] ≥ λ · OPT (v)− µ · Eb [SW (b,v)]
From Equation (4) we get,
Eb [SW (b,v)] −
∑
i∈[n]
Eb [Pi(b)] ≤ (1 + δ) · Eb [SW (b,v)] − γ · OPT (v)
As utilities are quasi-linear, the left hand side of the above two inequalities are equal. Rearranging,
we get: Eb [SW (b,v)] ≥ λ+γ1+µ+δOPT (v), as required.
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3.2 Incomplete Information: Extension Theorem for Revenue Guaranteed Auc-
tions
In a similar manner to the smoothness extension theorem, we can prove an extension theorem for the
revenue guarantee property, which gives expected welfare guarantees for settings with incomplete
information. However, this extension theorem is stronger, in the sense that it holds with respect
to correlated distributions and not only product prior distributions.
Theorem 3.5. If an auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed with respect to a bid space B′ ⊆ B1×· · ·×
Bn, then for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 × . . . × Vn), possibly correlated, and every strategy
profile σ : V1 × . . .× Vn → ∆(B′), in which the expected sum of player utilities is non-negative, the
expected social welfare is at least γ1+δ of the expected optimal social welfare.
Proof. We give a proof for pure strategies. The proof for mixed strategies follows by adding in a
straightforward way another expectation over the random actions chosen in the strategy profile σ.
As the utility of each player is quasi-linear and the expected sum of player utilities is non-negative,
we use linearity of expectation and get,
0 ≤
∑
i∈[n]
Ev [ui(σ(v), vi)]
=
∑
i∈[n]
Ev [vi(Si(σ(v)))] −
∑
i∈[n]
Ev [Pi(σ(v))]
= Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] −
∑
i∈[n]
Ev [Pi(σ(v))]
By the (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed property, for each v in the support of v,∑
i∈[n]
Pi(σ(v)) ≥ γ · OPT (v)− δ · SW (σ(v), v)
Punting it all together, we get,
0 ≤ Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] −
∑
i∈[n]
Ev [Pi(σ(v))]
≤ Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] − Ev [γOPT (v)− δSW (σ(v),v)] (5)
= (1 + δ) · Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] − γ · Ev [OPT (v)] (6)
Rearranging, we get: Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] ≥ γ1+δEv [OPT (v)], as required.
As the expected utility of each player is non-negative at any equilibrium strategy profile, we
infer that if an auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed with respect to a bid space B′, then for every
joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 × . . . × Vn), possibly correlated, the expected social welfare at any
mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium, σ : V1 × . . . × Vn → ∆(B′), is at least γ1+δ of the expected optimal
social welfare.
For an auction that is both smooth and revenue guaranteed, we give a better bound on the
price of anarchy, if the joint distribution F is a product distribution:
Theorem 3.6. If an auction is (λ, µ)−smooth with respect to a bid space B′ and (γ, δ)−revenue
guaranteed with respect to a bid space B”, then for every product distribution F , every mixed Bayes
Nash equilibrium, σ : V1 × . . .× Vn → ∆(B′ ∩ B”), has expected social welfare at least λ+γ1+µ+δ of the
expected optimal social welfare.
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Proof. We give a proof for pure Bayes Nash equilibrium. The proof for mixed Bayes Nash equi-
librium follows by adding in a straightforward way another expectation over the random actions
chosen in the strategy profile σ. The proof follows by the proofs of Theorem 2.13 and Theorem 3.5.
The proof of Theorem 2.13 shows that:
Ev

∑
i∈[n]
ui(σ(v), vi)

 ≥ λ · Ev [OPT (v)]− µ · Ev [SW (σ(v),v)]
From Equation (6) we get,
Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] −
∑
i∈[n]
Ev [Pi(σ(v))] ≤ (1 + δ) · Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] − γ · Ev [OPT (v)]
As utilities are quasi-linear, the left hand side of the above two inequalities are equal. Rearranging,
we get: Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] ≥ λ+γ1+µ+δEv [OPT (v)], as required.
Remark Note that we defined revenue guaranteed auctions for full information with respect to a
bid space B′, and then used extension theorem to prove positive results for incomplete information
on strategy space σ : V1 × . . . × Vn → ∆(B′). A different approach is to add an incomplete
information definition to revenue guaranteed auctions with respect to a strategy space Σ′ and by
that get positive results in incomplete information for a wider strategy space. Moreover, there
might be auctions that are revenue guaranteed only in expectation and hence do not fall into the
current definition. We give such definitions and corresponding theorems in Appendix C.
4 Simultaneous Second Price Auctions with No-Underbidding
We begin this section by defining what it means to underbid on an item. Let b−j denote the bids
of all bidders on items [m] \ {j}.
Definition 4.1 (item underbidding). Fix b−j . Player i is said to underbid on item j if: bij <
vi(j | Si(b−j)), where Si(b−j) = {k | k 6= j, bik = maxl {blk}}.
That is, we say that player i underbids on item j in a bid profile b if i’s bid on item j is smaller
than the marginal valuation of j with respect to the set of items other than j won by i.
We next show that underbidding is weakly dominated in a precise sense that we define next.
Consider a bid profile b. Let b−j be the bids of all bidders on all items except j, and let b−ij be
the bids on item j of all players, except player i.
Definition 4.2 (weakly dominated). A bid b′ij is weakly dominated by bid bij , with respect to
b−j, if the following two conditions hold:
1. ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) ≥ ui(b′ij, b−ij ,b−j ; vi), for every b−ij
2. There exists b−ij such that the inequality in (1) holds strictly.
The following lemma shows that underbidding on an item in a bid profile is weakly dominated
by bidding its marginal value.
Lemma 4.3. In S2PA, for every player i, every item j, and every bid profile b−j , underbidding
on item j is weakly dominated by bidding bij = vi(j | Si(b−j)), with respect to b−j .
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Proof. Fix b−j, and denote pj = maxl 6=i {blj}. Let b′ij be an underbidding bid on item j by player
i, i.e., b′ij < vi(j | Si(b−j)). We first show that ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) ≥ ui(b′ij, b−ij ,b−j ; vi) for every
b−ij.
• If b′ij ≥ pj, player i wins item j under both b′ij and bij , pays pj on item j in both cases, thus
ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) = ui(b′ij, b−ij ,b−j ; vi).
• If bij < pj, player i doesn’t win item j under both b′ij and bij , pays 0 on item j in both cases,
thus ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) = ui(b′ij, b−ij ,b−j ; vi).
• If bij ≥ pj but b′ij < pj, player i wins item j under bij and pays pj on item j, but she
doesn’t win item j under b′ij . As vi(j | Si(b−j)) = bij ≥ pj , we have ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) ≥
ui(b
′
ij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi).
Next, we show that there exists b−ij such that ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) > ui(b′ij, b−ij ,b−j ; vi). Let
ǫ > 0 be such that bij = b
′
ij + ǫ. Consider b−ij and player l 6= i such that blj = b′ij + ǫ2 = pj .
Then, player i doesn’t win item j under b′ij , but she does win item j under bij with a payment of
b′ij +
ǫ
2 < bij = vi(j|Si(b−j)) on item j. Therefore, ui(bij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi) > ui(b′ij , b−ij ,b−j ; vi).
Motivated by the above analysis, we next define the notion of item no underbidding (iNUB):
Definition 4.4 (Item No-UnderBidding (iNUB)). Given a valuation profile v ∈ V1× . . .×Vn,
we say that a bid profile b ∈ B satisfies iNUB if there exists a welfare maximizing allocation,
S∗(v) = (S∗1(v), . . . , S
∗
n(v)), such that for every player i and every item j ∈ S∗i (v)\Si(b) it holds
that: bij ≥ vi(j | Si(b)).
We also define the following notion of set no underbidding (sNUB), as follows:
Definition 4.5 (Set No underbidding (sNUB)). Given a valuation profile v ∈ V1 × . . . × Vn,
we say that a bid profile b ∈ B satisfies sNUB if there exists a welfare maximizing allocation,
S∗(v) = (S∗1(v), . . . , S
∗
n(v)), such that for every player i, it holds that∑
j∈S′
bij ≥ vi(S′ | Si(b)), where S′ = S∗i (v)\Si(b).
In Section 5 we show that if valuations are submodular, every bid profile that satisfies iNUB,
also satisfies sNUB. The opposite is not necessarily true, as demonstrated in Appendix D. For unit-
demand bidders, iNUB and sNUB coincide (as one can assume w.l.o.g. that every bidder receives
a single item in an optimal allocation).
The following theorem shows that sNUB is a powerful property.
Theorem 4.6. S2PA with monotone valuation functions is (1, 1)−revenue guaranteed with respect
to bid profiles satisfying sNUB.
Proof. In what follows, the first inequality follows by Lemma 2.5, and the second inequality follows
by the fact that b satisfies sNUB. The last inequality follows by monotonicity of valuations.
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n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij
≥
n∑
i=1
[vi ( Si(b) ∪ (S∗i (v)\Si(b)) )− vi ( Si(b) )]
=
n∑
i=1
[vi(Si(b) ∪ S∗i (v)) − vi(Si(b)]
≥
n∑
i=1
[vi(S
∗
i (v)) − vi(Si(b)]
= OPT (v)− SW (b,v)
The following corollary follows directly by Theorems 4.6 and 3.5.
Corollary 4.7. In an S2PA with monotone valuations, for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 ×
. . .×Vn), possibly correlated, every mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium that satisfies sNUB has expected
social welfare at least 12 of the expected optimal social welfare.
Remark In this section we give a full information definition of no-underbidding bid profiles
(sNUB) and prove Theorem 4.6 accordingly. In Appendix C we give an incomplete information
definition of no-underbidding strategy profiles, which requires no-underbidding in expectation. This
broader definition, together with a broader definition of incomplete information revenue guaranteed
auctions, allows us to get positive results in incomplete information setting for a wider strategy
space.
5 S2PA with Submodular Valuations
In this section we study S2PA with submodular (and α-submodular) valuations. We first show that
for this class of valuations, the notion of iNUB suffices for establishing positive results.
Theorem 5.1. Every S2PA with α−SM valuations is (α,α)−revenue guaranteed with respect to
bid profiles satisfying iNUB.
Proof. In what follows, the first inequality follows by Lemma 2.5, and the second inequality follows
by the fact that b satisfies iNUB.
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n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij
≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
vi(j | Si(b))
=
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
vi(j | Si(b)) (7)
≥
n∑
i=1
α · vi(S∗i (v) | Si(b)) (8)
≥
n∑
i=1
α · [vi(S∗i (v)) − vi(Si(b)] (9)
= α · OPT (v)− α · SW (b,v)
Equality (7) is due to the fact that vi(j | Si(b)) = 0 for every j ∈ Si(b). Inequality (8) follows
from Lemma 2.9, and Inequality (9) is due to monotonicity of valuations.
An immediate corollary from Theorems 3.5 and 5.1 is:
Corollary 5.2. In an S2PA with α−SM valuations, for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 × . . .×
Vn), possibly correlated, and every strategy profile σ that satisfies iNUB for which the expected sum
of player utilities is non-negative, the expected social welfare is at least α1+α of the expected optimal
social welfare. In particular, for SM valuations (where α = 1), we get at least 12 of the expected
optimal social welfare.
The 1/2 bound for submodular valuations is tight, even with respect to unit-demand valuations
and even in equilibrium, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3. There exists an S2PA with unit-demand valuations that admits a PNE bid profile
that satisfies iNUB, where the social welfare in equilibrium is 12 of the optimal social welfare.
Proof. Consider an S2PA with two unit demand players and 2 items, {x, y}, where v1(x) = 2,
v1(y) = 1, v2(x) = 1 and v2(y) = 2. An optimal allocation gives item x to player 1 and item y to
player 2, for a welfare of 4. Consider the following bid profile b: b1x = 1, b1y = 100, b2x = 100 and
b2y = 1. Player 1 wins item y for a price of 1, and player 2 wins item x for a price of 1. It is easy
to see that b is a PNE that satisfies iNUB. The social welfare of this equilibrium is 2, which is 12
of the optimal social welfare.
We next show that for submodular valuations, iNUB implies sNUB.
Proposition 5.4. For every SM valuation v, every bid profile b that satisfies iNUB also satisfies
sNUB.
Proof. By iNUB, for every item j ∈ S∗i (v) \ Si(b), it holds that bij ≥ vi(j | Si(b)). It follows that∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij ≥
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
vi(j | Si(b)) ≥ vi(S∗i (v) \ Si(b) | Si(b)),
where the last inequality follows by Lemma 2.9 for α = 1.
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Therefore, Theorem 4.6 and Corollary 4.7 also apply to every SM valuation that satisfies iNUB.
That is,
Corollary 5.5. S2PA with submodular valuation functions is (1, 1)−revenue guaranteed with re-
spect to bid profiles satisfying iNUB.
Corollary 5.6. In an S2PA with submodular valuations, for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 ×
. . .×Vn), possibly correlated, every mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium that satisfies iNUB has expected
social welfare at least 12 of the expected optimal social welfare.
For bid profiles that satisfy both iNUB and NOB, we get a better bound as a direct corollary
from Theorems 5.1, 2.16, and 3.6.
Corollary 5.7. In an S2PA with α−SM valuations, for every product distribution F , every mixed
Bayes Nash equilibrium that satisfies both NOB and iNUB has expected social welfare at least 2α2+α
of the expected optimal social welfare. In particular, for SM valuations (where α = 1) this amounts
to at least 23 of the expected optimal social welfare, and this is tight.
The bound of 2/3 for submodular valuations is tight even with respect to a PNE with unit-
demand valuations. This is shown in Example 1.2 in Section 1.
A remark about existence of pure NE is in order. In the next section, we show that every S2PA
with XOS valuations admits a pure NE that satisfies both NOB and sNUB (Theorem 6.3). Since
every submodular valuation is XOS, the existence result applies also to submodular valuations.
6 S2PA with XOS Valuations
6.1 XOS Valuations under iNUB
For XOS valuations, iNUB does not imply sNUB, thus iNUB does not lead automatically to PoA
lower bounds. Indeed, Example 6.1 shows an instance of S2PA with XOS valuations that admits
a PNE bid profile that satisfies iNUB, with social welfare that is only a 2
m
fraction of the optimal
social welfare.
Example 6.1. Consider an S2PA with two players, with the following XOS valuation functions v1
and v2, respectively, over m items:
v1(S) = max
{
a1(S), a2(S)
}
,
v2(S) = max
{
a3(S), a4(S)
}
where:
a1 = (a11, a
1
2, . . . , a
1
m) = (2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
a2 = (a21, a
2
2, . . . , a
2
m) = (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
a3 = (a31, a
3
2, . . . , a
3
m) = (0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, . . . , 2),
a4 = (a41, a
4
2, . . . , a
4
m) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
The optimal allocation has welfare 2m, giving the first two items to player 1 and the last m − 2
items to player 2. Consider the following bid profile b = (b1, b2), where:
b1 = (0, 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, . . . , 2)
b2 = (2, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, . . . , 0)
Player 2 wins the first two items and player 1 wins the last m− 2 items. It is easy to see that b is
an equilibrium which satisfies iNUB. The social welfare of this equilibrium is 4, which is 2
m
of the
optimal social welfare.
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6.2 XOS Valuations under sNUB
As Theorem 4.6 and Corollary 4.7 apply for arbitrary monotone valuation functions, the PoA is at
least 12 with respect to bid profiles satisfying sNUB. An immediate corollary from Theorems 2.15,
4.6 and 3.6 is:
Corollary 6.2. In an S2PA with XOS valuations, for every product distribution F , every mixed
Bayes Nash equilibrium that satisfies both NOB and sNUB has expected social welfare at least 23 of
the expected optimal social welfare.
As in the case of submodular valuations, this result is tight (see Example 1.2).
As for existence of equilibria, we next show that every S2PA with XOS valuations admits a
pure NE that satisfies both NOB and sNUB.
Theorem 6.3. In S2PA with XOS valuations there always exists at least one pure Nash equilibrium
that satisfies both NOB and sNUB.
Proof. Christodoulou et al. [5] showed that every S2PA with XOS valuations admits a PNE satis-
fying NOB. We show that the same PNE satisfies sNUB as well. Let S∗(v) = (S∗1(v), . . . , S
∗
n(v))
be a welfare maximizing allocation, and let a∗i be an additive valuation such that vi(S
∗
i (v)) =∑
j∈S∗i (v) a
∗
ij . Consider the bid profile in which every player bids according to the maximizing
additive valuation with respect to her set S∗i (v), i.e., bij = a
∗
ij for every j ∈ S∗i (v) and bij = 0
otherwise. One can easily verify that this bid profile is a PNE that satisfies NOB. It thus remains
to show that it also satisfies sNUB. Recall that sNUB imposes restrictions on the bid values of the
set S′ = S∗i (v)\Si(b). Under the above bid profile we have Si(b) = S∗i (v), i.e., S′ = ∅ and sNUB
holds trivially.
7 S2PA with Subadditive Valuations
Recall that S2PA with arbitrary monotone valuations is (1, 1)−revenue guaranteed with respect to
bid profiles that satisfy sNUB (Theorem 4.6). Hence, the Bayesian PoA for equilibria satisfying
sNUB is at least 12 and this bound is tight (Proposition 5.3).
For subadditive valuations, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [1] showed that the social welfare of
any PNE (if exists) satisfying NOB is at least 12 of the optimal social welfare.
1 They also showed
that this bound is tight. In their proof, they used the fact that the revenue is non-negative. Under
our sNUB condition, the auction is (1, 1)−revenue guaranteed, implying that the revenue is lower
bounded by OPT (v) − SW (b,v). Plugging this lower bound into their proof, we get:
Theorem 7.1. In an S2PA with subadditive valuations and at least one pure Nash equilibrium that
satisfies both NOB and sNUB, the social welfare of such a PNE is at least 23 of the expected optimal
social welfare.
Proof. Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [1] showed that for subadditive valuations the following holds
for any PNE, b, satisfying NOB, if exists2∑
i∈[n]
ui(b, vi) ≥ OPT (v) − SW (b,v)
1Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [1] used the strong no-overbidding assumption, where the sum of bids on any set of
items does not exceed the value of that set. However, the NOB condition, as defined in our paper, suffices for their
proof.
2This may look as a smoothness argument. However, while the hypothetical deviation considered in the smoothness
proof depends on v but not on b, the proof in [1] invokes the Nash equilibrium hypothesis for player i with an
hypothetical deviation that depends on the bid vectors b−i of the other players.
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Since we assume that b also satisfies sNUB, we have that:
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥ OPT (v)− SW (b,v)
As utilities are quasi-linear, we get,
∑
i∈[n]
ui(b, vi) = SW (b,v) −
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b)
≤ SW (b,v) − [OPT (v)− SW (b,v)]
= 2 · SW (b,v) −OPT (v)
Putting it all together, we get:
2 · SW (b,v)−OPT (v) ≥
∑
i∈[n]
ui(b, vi)
≥ OPT (v)− SW (b,v)
Rearranging, we get: SW (b,v) ≥ 23OPT (v), as required.
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [1] generalized the results from PNE to CCE and showed that in
an S2PA with subadditive valuations the social welfare of every CCE satisfying NOB is at least
1
2 of the optimal social welfare. Adding the assumption that the CCE satisfies also sNUB, it is
straightforward to show (in a similar manner to the proof of Theorem 7.1 ) that:
Theorem 7.2. In an S2PA with subadditive valuations, the social welfare of every CCE satisfying
both NOB and sNUB, is at least 23 of the optimal social welfare.
Example 1.2 shows that the above bound is tight.
Feldman et al. [9] proved that in an S2PA with independent subadditive valuations the expected
social welfare of every mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium which satisfies NOB, is at least 14 of the optimal
social welfare. Adding the sNUB assumption to the bid profile and using the fact the auction is
(1, 1)−revenue guaranteed (as in the proof of Theorem 7.1) improves the lower bound on the BPoA
to 12 for independent subadditive valuations with both NOB and sNUB. Recall that the same lower
bound is obtained without the NOB or equilibrium assumptions (see Corollary 4.7). We conclude
that NOB does not improve the BPoA bound in this case.
Bhawalkar and Roughgarden [1] gave an example of S2PA with subadditive valuations that does
not have a PNE satisfying strong NOB (i.e., for every i and every subset S ⊆ [m],∑j∈S bij ≤ vi(S)).
Du¨tting et al. [8] proved that it is NP-hard to decide whether there exists a PNE in VCGmechanisms
for agents with subadditive valuations and additive bids. That is, a PNE in S2PA with subadditive
valuations is not guaranteed to exist.
In general, a mixed equilibrium may not exist in infinite games (as in our case of continuous
valuations and continuous bids). However, We can approximate the continuous auction with a
finite discretized version which is guaranteed to admit a mixed equilibrium by Nash’s theorem. We
refer the readers to the relevant discussion in Feldman et al. [9] and Cai and Papadimitriou [3].
Under the finite discretized version of the auction, a mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium is guaranteed
to exist. It remains to show, however, that the space of bid profiles satisfying both sNUB and NOB
is non-empty.
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Observation 7.3. Every S2PA with arbitrary monotone valuation functions admits a bid profile
that satisfies both sNUB and NOB.
Proof. Let S∗(v) = (S∗1(v), . . . , S
∗
n(v)) be an optimal allocation. Consider the bid profile b, where
bij =
vi(S∗i (v))
|S∗i (v)| for j ∈ S
∗
i (v) and 0 otherwise. Notice that each bidder i wins the items she gets
in S∗(v), i.e., Si(b) = S∗i (v). Hence,
∑
j∈Si(b) bij =
∑
j∈S∗i (v) bij = vi(S
∗
i (v)) = vi(Si(b)), showing
that b satisfies NOB. Moreover, as S∗i (v)\Si(b) = ∅, b also satisfies sNUB.
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A XOS Valuations are not α−SM
The following example shows that there exists an XOS function over identical items, sets S ⊂ T
and j /∈ T such that v(j | S) < α · v(j | T ) for every α > 0.
Example A.1. Consider three identical items and valuation function v, where
v(S) =
{
1, if |S| ∈ {1, 2}
1.5, if |S| = 3
One can verify that v is an XOS function. Let S be a set that contains a single item, and T be a set
that contains two items, such that S ⊂ T . For j /∈ T it holds that v(j | S) = 0, and v(j | T ) = 0.5.
Thus, v(j | S) < α · v(j | T ) for every α > 0.
B Proofs of Smoothness Extension Theorems
Following is the proof of Theorem 2.12. The proof is based on the proofs in [16] and [18] with the
necessary adjustments.
Proof. (of Theorem 2.12) As the utility of each player is quasi-linear and payments are non negative,∑
i∈[n]
Eb [ui(b, vi)] ≤ Eb [SW (b,v)]
By smoothness, for each b in the support of b, there exists a bid b∗i (v) ∈ Bi for each player i, s.t.:∑
i∈[n]
ui(b
∗
i (v), b−i, vi) ≥ λOPT (v)− µSW (b,v)
Since b is a CCE, we get from Definition 2.4,
Eb [ui(b, vi)] ≥ Eb [ui(b∗i (v),b−i, vi)]
Punting it all together and using linearity of expectation we get,
Eb [SW (b,v)] ≥
∑
i∈[n]
Eb [ui(b, vi)]
≥
∑
i∈[n]
Eb [ui(b
∗
i (v),b−i, vi)]
≥ Eb [λOPT (v)− µSW (b,v)]
= λOPT (v) − µEb [SW (b,v)] (10)
Rearranging, we get: Eb [SW (b,v)] ≥ λ1+µOPT (v), as required.
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Following is the proof of Theorem 2.13. The proof is based on the proofs in [17] and [19] with
the necessary adjustments.
Proof. (of Theorem 2.13) We give a proof for pure Bayes Nash equilibrium. The proof for mixed
Bayes Nash equilibrium follows by adding in a straightforward way another expectation over the
random actions chosen in the strategy profile σ.
Recall that the valuations vi are independent and that the strategy σi(vi) of player i depends
only on vi. However, the smoothness definition (Definition 2.11) assumes that the hypothetical
deviation of player i depends on the full valuation profile. Since player i doesn’t know the valuation
of the other players, she randomly samples an independent valuation profile w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∼ F
and decides on the hypothetical deviation b∗i (vi,w−i) accordingly.
As σ is a BNE of the auction, using Inequality (2) we get,
Ev [ui(σ(v), vi)] ≥ EvEw [ui(b∗i (vi,w−i), σ−i(v−i), vi)]
= EvEw [ui(b
∗
i (wi,w−i), σ−i(v−i), wi)]
= EvEw [ui(b
∗
i (w), σ−i(v−i), wi)]
The equality follows by renaming due to independence. Now, let us sum over all players and
then use the smoothness Inequality (3) and linearity of expectation to get,
Ev

∑
i∈[n]
ui(σ(v), vi)

 ≥ EvEw

∑
i∈[n]
ui(b
∗
i (w), σ−i(v−i), wi)


≥ EvEw [λOPT (w)− µSW (σ(v),v)]
= λEw [OPT (w)]− µEv [SW (σ(v),v)] (11)
As the utility of each player is quasi-linear and payments are non negative,
Ev

∑
i∈[n]
ui(σ(v), vi)

 ≤ Ev [SW (σ(v),v)]
Hence,
Ev [SW (σ(v),v)] ≥ λEv [OPT (v)] − µEv [SW (σ(v),v)]
The proof follows by rearranging.
C Revenue Guaranteed Auctions in Settings with Incomplete In-
formation
In the paper we defined both revenue guaranteed auctions and no-underbidding bid profile for full
information with respect to a bid space B′, which is the space of all bid profiles satisfying sNUB. We
then used extension theorem to prove positive results for incomplete information on strategy space
σ : V1× . . .×Vn → ∆(B′), i.e. for all strategies supported by bids σ(v) satisfying sNUB. However,
there might be strategies which satisfy no-underbidding only in expectation and yet guarantee lower
bound on the expected revenue. Moreover, there might be auctions that are revenue guaranteed
only in expectation. To prove results in incomplete information for such broader cases, we give
here incomplete information definition to both revenue guaranteed auctions and no-underbidding
strategy profiles.
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Definition C.1 (Revenue guaranteed auction of incomplete information). An incomplete
information auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed for some 0 ≤ γ ≤ δ ≤ 1 with respect to a
strategy space Σ′ ⊆ ∆(Σ1× . . .×Σn), if for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1× . . .×Vn), possibly
correlated, and for any strategy profile σ ∈ Σ′, the expected revenue of the auction is at least
γ Ev∼F [OPT (v)]− δ Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)].
Theorem C.2. If an incomplete information auction is (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed with respect to
a strategy space Σ′ ⊆ ∆(Σ1 × . . . × Σn), then for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 × . . . × Vn),
possibly correlated, and every strategy profile σ ∈ Σ′, in which the expected sum of players utility is
non-negative, the expected social welfare is at least γ1+δ of the expected optimal social welfare.
Proof. As the utility of each player is quasi-linear and the expected sum of player utilities is non-
negative, we use linearity of expectation and get,
0 ≤
∑
i∈[n]
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [ui(b, vi)]
=
∑
i∈[n]
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [vi(Si(b))]−
∑
i∈[n]
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [Pi(b)]
= Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)] −
∑
i∈[n]
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [Pi(b)]
By the (γ, δ)−revenue guaranteed property for incomplete information,∑
i∈[n]
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [Pi(b)] ≥ γ Ev∼F [OPT (v)] − δ Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)]
Punting it all together, we get,
0 ≤ Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)] −
∑
i∈[n]
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [Pi(b)]
≤ Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)] − γ Ev∼F [OPT (v)] + δ Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)]
= (1 + δ) Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)] − γ Ev∼F [OPT (v)]
Rearranging, we get: Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)] ≥ γ1+δ Ev∼F [OPT (v)], as required.
Definition C.3 (Set No underbidding in expectation). A strategy profile σ ∈ ∆(Σ1×. . .×Σn)
satisfies sNUB in expectation if for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1×. . .×Vn), possibly correlated,
and for every player i the following holds,
Ev∼F|vi Eb∼σ(v)

 ∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij

 ≥ Ev∼F|vi Eb∼σ(v) [vi ( S∗i (v)\Si(b) | Si(b) )]
Theorem C.4. An incomplete information S2PA with monotone valuation functions is (1, 1)−revenue
guaranteed with respect to strategy profiles satisfying sNUB in expectation.
Proof. We start with Lemma 2.5, use linearity of expectation and the fact that σ satisfies sNUB in
expectation,
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Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v)

 n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b)

 ≥ Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v)

 n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij


=
n∑
i=1
Ev∼FEb∼σ(v)

 ∑
j∈S∗i (v)\Si(b)
bij


≥
n∑
i=1
Ev∼FEb∼σ(v) [vi ( S∗i (v)\Si(b) | Si(b) )]
=
n∑
i=1
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [vi(Si(b) ∪ S∗i (v)) − vi(Si(b)]
≥
n∑
i=1
Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [vi(S∗i (v)) − vi(Si(b)]
= Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v)
[
n∑
i=1
[vi(S
∗
i (v)) − vi(Si(b)]
]
= Ev∼F [OPT (v)]− Ev∼F Eb∼σ(v) [SW (b,v)]
The last Inequality follows from monoticity of valuations.
Corollary C.5. In an incomplete information S2PA with monotone valuations, for every joint
distribution F ∈ ∆(V1 × . . . × Vn), possibly correlated, every mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium that
satisfies sNUB in expectation has expected social welfare at least 12 of the expected optimal social
welfare.
D sNUB does not Imply iNUB
Following is an example of an S2PA with submodular bidders that admits a PNE satisfying sNUB
but not iNUB.
Example D.1. Two submodular bidders: {1, 2}, and three items: {x, y, z}.
v1(x) = 5, v1(y) = 5, v1(z) = 10, v1(xy) = 10, v1(xz) = 15, v1(yz) = 15, v1(xyz) = 16
v2(x) = 8, v2(y) = 8, v2(z) = 15, v2(xy) = 14, v2(xz) = 15, v2(yz) = 15, v2(xyz) = 15
The optimal allocation is: S∗1 = {xy}, S∗2 = {z}, OPT = 10 + 15 = 25.
One can verify that the following bid profile b is a PNE:
b1x = 3, b1y = 3, b1z = 8
b2x = 8, b2y = 8, b2z = 2,
and the obtained allocation under b is:
S1(b) = {z}, S2(b) = {xy}, SW = 10 + 14 = 24.
We first show that b satisfies sNUB. Indeed,
6 = b1x + b1y ≥ v1(xy | z) = 6
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and also,
2 = b2z ≥ v2(z | xy) = 1.
However, b does not satisfy iNUB, since
3 = b1x < v1(x | z) = 5.
E S2PA with XOS Valuations and iNUB
Theorem E.1. Every S2PA with XOS valuations and a bid profile b that satisfies iNUB is
(1,m)−revenue guaranteed, where m is the number of items.
Proof. We start with Inequality (7):
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
[vi(Si(b) ∪ {j})− vi(Si(b)] (12)
Consider the first term on the right hand side of Inequality (12). Let v∗i be the maximizing additive
valuation of player i with respect to her set S∗i (v). As vi is an XOS function, for every set S
′ ⊆ [m]
we have vi(S
′) ≥∑j∈S′ v∗i ({j}). Hence, together with monoticity of vi, we get:
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
vi(Si(b) ∪ {j}) ≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
vi({j})
≥
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
v∗i ({j})
=
n∑
i=1
vi(S
∗
i (v))
= OPT (v) (13)
Consider the second term on the right hand side of Inequality (12),
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈S∗i (v)
vi(Si(b)) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈[m]
vi(Si(b))
=
∑
j∈[m]
n∑
i=1
vi(Si(b))
=
∑
j∈[m]
SW (b,v)
= m · SW (b,v) (14)
Combining Equations (12), (13) and (14), we get:
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Si(b)
pj(b) ≥ OPT (v) −m · SW (b,v)
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Corollary E.2. In an S2PA with XOS valuations, for every joint distribution F ∈ ∆(V1×. . .×Vn),
possibly correlated, every mixed Bayes Nash equilibrium that satisfies iNUB has expected social
welfare at least 1
m+1 of the expected optimal social welfare.
We next show an example of an instance with 4 items and 2 xos bidders, where the PoA with
NOB and iNUB is 1/2, which is no better than the guarantee obtained with NOB alone.
Example E.3. There are two xos bidders, {1, 2}, and four items, {x, y, z, w}. Let,
v1(S) = max
{
a1(S), a2(S)
}
and,
v2(S) = max
{
a3(S), a4(S)
}
where:
a1 = (a1x, a
1
y, a
1
z, a
1
w) = (2, 2, 0, 0),
a2 = (a2x, a
2
y, a
2
z, a
2
w) = (0, 0, 1, 1),
a3 = (a3x, a
3
y, a
3
z, a
3
w) = (0, 0, 2, 2),
a4 = (a4x, a
4
y, a
4
z, a
4
w) = (1, 1, 0, 0).
The optimal allocation has welfare 8, giving items x and y to player 1 and items z and w to
player 2. Consider the pure Nash equilibrium bid profile b = (b1, b2), where:
b1 = (b1x, b1y, b1z , b1w) = (0, 0, 1, 1) and,
b2 = (b2x, b2y, b2z , b2w) = (1, 1, 0, 0)
Player 1 wins items z and w and player 2 wins items x and y. b satisfies NOB and iNUB, and
obtains welfare 4, which equals half of OPT .
F S2PA with Monotone Valuations and iNUB
The following example shows that beyond subadditive valuations, the PoA can be arbitrarily bad
under bid profiles satisfying iNUB.
Example F.1. 2 items: {x, y}, 2 single-minded bidders, who only derive value from the package of
both items. Suppose v1(xy) = 1, v2(xy) = R (where R is arbitrarily large), and the value for any
strict subset of xy is 0. Consider the following bid profile (which is a PNE that adheres to iNUB):
b1x = b1y = R, and b2x = b2y = 0. Under this bid profile, both items go to agent 1, for a PoA R.
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